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P
redicting economic activity is important for numerous reasons. It is
important for business ﬁrms because it aids in deciding how much
capacity will be needed to meet future demand. It is important for
various government agencies when forecasting budgetary surpluses or deﬁcits.
And it is important for the Federal Reserve (the Fed) in deciding the stance
of current monetary policy. One set of variables that are potentially useful in
forecasting economic activity are ﬁnancial variables.
Financial market participants are forward-looking, and as a result the prices
of various securities embody expectations of future economic activity. This
pricing behavior implies that data from ﬁnancial markets may reasonably be
expected to help forecast the growth rate of the economy. Using ﬁnancial
variables to aid in economic projections, therefore, is fairly commonplace. In
particular, the yield curve spread between long- and short-term interest rates
has received a lot of recent attention. Although not the ﬁrst to consider the
implications that the spread has for predicting economic activity, Stock and
Watson (1989) provided much of the impetus for further research by ﬁnding
that the spread was an important component of their newly constructed index of
leading economic indicators. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) also thoroughly
document the signiﬁcant relationship between interest rate spreads and future
output growth.
Unfortunately, one of the spread’s major predictive failures occurred im-
mediately after the publication of these inﬂuential articles. Namely, the spread
failed to predict the 1990–91 recession. In light of that occurrence, a number
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of papers reinvestigated the spread’s predictive content. Among these are the
works of Estrella and Mishkin (1997, 1998), Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996),
Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), and Dueker (1997). These studies mainly
concluded that the spread still contains signiﬁcant information for predicting
economic activity.
This article reinforces the view that the spread is generally a useful variable
in predicting future growth in real GDP but also indicates that it has become
less useful in recent years. In particular, the recent accuracy of the spread’s
prediction of GDP growth, both in-sample and out-of-sample, is less precise
than over earlier sample periods. In fact, adding the spread to a VAR contain-
ing lagged output growth and short-term interest rates increases the root mean
squared error of the out-of-sample forecast errors over the period 1985 to 1997.
After brieﬂy reviewing relevant literature, I informally characterize the
joint behavior of output growth and the spread. From this characterization it
is clear that there is a relationship between the two variables, although that
relationship is far from perfect. I then attempt to expand on the existing lit-
erature by analyzing the predictive content of the spread along a number of
new dimensions. In particular, I examine whether there are nonlinearities in
the relationship and whether the predictive content of the spread is closely
associated with the stance of monetary policy. Further, the results here indicate
the important differences between evaluations based on in-sample versus out-
of-sample predictive power. Presumably, it is the latter that is most relevant for
judging the ability to forecast.
1. RELATED LITERATURE
There is a wide and growing literature that examines the term structure of
interest rates’ predictive content for economic activity. The review given here
is selective and focuses on articles that signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the statistical
tests carried out later in this article.1 One of the most inﬂuential studies is that
of Stock and Watson (1989), which systematically attempts to construct a new
index of leading economic indicators. Their approach is to examine combina-
tions of 55 various macroeconomic variables and select the combination that
best predicts future economic activity. To make their search manageable, they
limit their index to seven variables—as does the current National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) list of leading indicators. One of the variables that
is an important component of their leading economic indicator is the spread
between the ten-year and one-year U.S. Treasury bond. Because their search
1 Other papers that look at the predictive content of the spread for real economic activity
include Laurent (1988, 1989), Harvey (1988), Frankel and Lown (1994), Bonser-Neal and Morley
(1997), and Kozicki (1997).  
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for a leading indicator series is fairly exhaustive, the ﬁnding that the yield
spread is an important element of their indicator lent impetus to exploring the
predictive content of this variable in isolation.
One article that supports using the spread alone in predicting economic
growth is by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991). Examining data over the period
1955 to 1988, they document that the spread between the yield on the ten-
year Treasury bond and the three-month Treasury bill is a useful predictor of
both cumulative economic growth up to four years in the future and marginal
economic growth rates up to seven quarters in the future. They also ﬁnd that
the spread contains information for future economic growth not already em-
bodied in the current level of real interest rates, in current economic growth, in
the current growth rate of the index of leading economic indicators, or in the
inﬂation rate. Further, they ﬁnd the spread useful in forecasting the probability
of a recession. An important implication of this article is its rule of thumb
applicability. By concentrating largely on the spread’s predictive content, the
article’s forecasting message is easy to apply and doesn’t require sophisticated
econometric tools or the application of large economic data sets.
Immediately after these two articles were written, the economy provided
another test of the predictive power of the spread. In this case, although the
spread narrowed and predicted somewhat weaker economic activity, it failed to
predict the 1990–91 recession. As a result, other researchers revisited the issue.
For example, Estrella and Mishkin (1997) examine the period 1973 to 1994 and
ﬁnd that the basic results of Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) continue to hold
in the United States as well as in a number of European countries. Haubrich
and Dombrosky (1996) also ﬁnd that over the period 1961:1 to 1995:3, the
yield spread is a relatively accurate predictor of four-quarter economic growth
but that its predictive content has changed over time. For example, they ﬁnd
that the yield spread was not a very good predictor of economic activity over
the period 1985 to 1995.
Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) examine the predictive content of the
spread between various maturities of long-term bonds and the three-month bill
rates for a variety of countries over the period August 1973 to December 1988.
A novel feature of their paper is the use of discount equivalent yields and the
fact that they match the maturity structure of the interest rate spread with the
forecast horizon being studied. They ﬁnd that the term spread has signiﬁcant
in-sample predictive content for future cumulative changes in industrial produc-
tion of up to ﬁve years but that this predictability is largely due to the spread’s
ability to predict activity at horizons of up to two years. Also, by looking
at the effects of the term spread on forward rates, they are able to show that
information in the longer end of the term structure is useful in predicting future
economic activity.
Other papers have concentrated on another feature of the Estrella and
Hardouvelis (1991) paper, namely, the ability of the term spread to signal   
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the probability of a recession. Estrella and Mishkin (1998), for example, using
data over the period 1959:1 to 1995:1, show that the spread between the yield
on the ten-year and three-month Treasury securities is the best out-of-sample
predictor of the probability of a recession occurring in the next four quar-
ters. For shorter horizons, they ﬁnd that adding movements in various stock
price indexes improves forecast accuracy. Dueker (1997) also ﬁnds that the
yield spread is a relatively good in-sample predictor of recessions. He adds a
lagged-state-of-the-economy variable and ﬁnds that it helps his model predict
the severity and duration of big recessions; but as in other studies, he ﬁnds that
milder recessions are harder to predict.
2. THE SPREAD AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Before beginning a detailed statistical analysis, it is instructive to take a more
casual view of the data and to consider why the spread may be a good pre-
dictor of economic activity. Figure 1 displays the behavior of (1) the spread
between the discount equivalent yield on the ten-year U.S. Treasury bond and
the three-month Treasury bill and (2) the four-quarter growth rate of real GDP.
The NBER recession dates are shaded in. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that
movements in the spread precede changes in real GDP growth and that these
two series are positively correlated. Thus the spread seems to indicate whether
future output growth will be strong or weak. Also, prior to a number of busi-
ness cycle peaks, namely, the 1969:4, 1973:4, 1980:1, and 1981:3 peaks, the
spread inverted with the short-term rate exceeding the rate on the long bond.
The spread also remained negative over most of these recessions. The spread
ﬂattened signiﬁcantly prior to the 1990:3 peak, but as the recession progressed,
the yield curve steepened. Such behavior typically indicates renewed strength in
the economy. Consequently, it appears that the spread did not perform quite as
well in this episode. Less-than-perfect performance is also observed around the
1957:3 and 1960:2 peaks. Further, one notices that the spread became negative
in late 1967, and the economy remained strong.
Figures 2a and 2b highlight the behavior of the spread around business
cycle peaks and troughs. Figure 2a reemphasizes the point that prior to most
recessions, the yield curve becomes inverted and usually remains inverted for
a good part of the recession. Figure 2b indicates that the yield curve, although
inverted during most recessions, begins to steepen prior to each business cycle
trough. Thus it seems reasonable that economic forecasters would ﬁnd the yield
spread a useful but imperfect guide of future economic activity.
The imprecision associated with the spread can be gauged by looking at
Table 1. In this table, I record the number of true and false signals of recessions
over the period 1956 to 1996. I look at two deﬁnitions of a signal. The ﬁrst
deﬁnition labels the signal as true if the yield curve is inverted and a recession
occurs either contemporaneously or within one-to-four quarters of the signal.        
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Figure 1 Real GDP Growth and Spread 1956–1997

























ff(t) ¡ ff(t ¡ 2)
> 0.5
Spread < 0.25
ff(t) ¡ ff(t ¡ 2)
> 0.5
True Signals 18 23 15 17
False Signals 2 13 2 8
Total Signals 20 35 17 25
True Signals 8 6 2 2
within recession
Pr (True Signal) 0.833 0.552 0.867 0.652
Notes: The sample is quarterly from 1955:1 to 1995:4. The spread equals the ten-year Treasury
bond rate minus the monthly average of the three-month Treasury bill rate. ff(t) is the federal
funds rate at time t.   
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Figure 2a Behavior of Spread around Business Cycle Peaks






























Figure 2b Behavior of Spread around Business Cycle Troughs





























The second deﬁnition uses a 25-basis-point cutoff. A signal is labeled false if
no recession occurs despite one of the above signals occurring. Looking at the
relative frequency of true and false signals will help establish the reliability of
the yield curve for predicting recessions. Note that this procedure says nothing     
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about instances when the yield spread failed to ﬂatten or invert prior to a reces-
sion. The exercise lets us determine if the yield curve is like the boy who cried
wolf or, in other words, if it correctly predicts a weakening in the economy.
I also investigate whether adding an indicator of monetary policy helps
reﬁne the signal. In this case a signal is labelled true if the spread inverted or
was less than 25 basis points, respectively, and the funds rate was increased
by more than 50 basis points in the preceding two quarters. The results in
Table 1 conﬁrm the graphical analysis that the spread is a useful but imperfect
indicator of declines in economic activity. Looking at column 1, the spread
inverts 18 times over the sample period, and on only two occasions does it
erroneously signal a recession. Those occasions are in 1966:4 and 1979:1. The
latter is labeled false only because it occurred ﬁve quarters prior to the onset
of a recession. The true signals are clustered around the peaks. There are two
true signals prior to and including the 1969:4 peak, three predate the 1973:4
peak, four precede the 1980:1 peak, and four precede the 1981:3 peak. Five of
the occurrences are during recessions, which trivially do not signal an impend-
ing recession. Therefore, if the yield curve inverts, there is a high probability
(83 percent) of an impending recession. The other columns conﬁrm the yield
curve’s value as a strong signaler of a recession. Generally, most of the false
signals occur in the mid- and late 1960s. Also, the character of the signals is
not very different when an indicator of monetary policy is used. Consequently,
there is not much evidence that the stance of monetary policy contributes to
the quality of the signal.
While at ﬁrst glance it appears that the spread contains information about
future economic activity, it is not clear why this is the case. I am unaware of any
formal economic model that investigates this issue. The spread contains direct
information on a number of economic variables. Because it is a difference
in nominal interest rates on bonds of different maturities, it is composed of
a real term spread, the expected difference in inﬂation, and a term premium.
Also, only temporary changes in these variables affect the spread. A permanent
increase in either inﬂation or the real rate of interest will have the same effect
on both the long- and short-term interest rates.
Often when there is an increase in expected inﬂation, as depicted by a
steepening of the yield curve, the Fed engages in contractionary monetary
policy by increasing short-term rates. In many of these episodes the long rate
also initially rises, but not by as much as the short rate, and the spread nar-
rows. Subsequently, as inﬂationary expectations subside, the long rate often
falls and the yield curve inverts. The result of the monetary tightening is often
a recession.2 Correspondingly, when economic activity is weak, the Fed often
2 An excellent documentation of a number of such episodes is provided by Goodfriend
(1993).          
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loosens monetary policy by decreasing the short-term interest rate. This action
generally causes the yield curve to steepen, and if an increase in inﬂationary
expectations results from the easing, the yield curve may steepen substantially.
Monetary easing often results in an increase in economic growth. Thus the
result of easy monetary policy is often a steepening of the yield curve and
increased economic activity. If these were the only reasons that movements in
the spread were associated with economic activity, then adequately capturing
the stance of monetary policy would leave little additional explanatory power
for the spread in forecasting economic growth.
There are, however, other reasons why the spread may communicate fu-
ture economic behavior. For example, Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) note
that the spread’s behavior is consistent with real business cycle theory. In a
real business cycle model, relatively high expected future growth would imply
rising real interest rates and a steepening of the term structure. The converse
would occur if growth was expected to slow. Accordingly, the spread could
signal expected changes in the economy that are due to nonmonetary shocks.
3. IN-SAMPLE PREDICTIVE CONTENT
In this section I examine the in-sample predictive content of the term spread
between the discount equivalent yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury bond and a
three-month Treasury bill. The sample period begins in 1955:1 and extends to
1997:4. Data on the discount equivalent yield is obtained by splicing McCul-
loch’s (1987) data set with data received from the Federal Reserve Board. The
Board’s data set begins in June 1961 and is not calculated in exactly the same
way as McCulloch’s; but except for a few years in the mid-1970s, the two
series are indistinguishable. Discount equivalent yields are used for compara-
bility purposes. I also use the ten-year, three-month spread to be comparable to
most other studies but generally ﬁnd that the main results of the analysis are
not sensitive to the particular spread used. Results using the two-year, three-
month spread and the ﬁve-year, three-month spread are similar to those reported
below.
Simple Regressions
First, let’s examine regressions that analyze the predictive content of the spread
and various transformations of the spread for future GDP growth. I explore how
sensitive the results are over different sample periods. The main ﬁnding is that
the spread has predictive content for future output growth but that the regression
coefﬁcients change somewhat over different sample periods. I analyze the pre-
dictive content both cumulatively, up to two years, and marginally. Speciﬁcally,
the regressions for cumulative growth are of the form
(400/k)ln(yt+k/yt) = ®0 + ®1st + et, (1)               
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Table 2 Cumulative and Marginal Predictions of GDP Growth
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Cumulative Marginal
Sample Period k ® ®1 R2 ® ®1 R2
1955:1–1997:4 2 0.96 (3.70) 0.134
4 0.88 (3.86) 0.182 0.80 ( 3.10) 0.092
6 0.70 (3.25) 0.170 0.38 ( 1.68) 0.016
8 0.53 (2.74) 0.127 ¡0.01 (¡0.04) ¡0.006
1955:1–1973:4 2 2.03 (3.24) 0.151
4 1.98 (4.19) 0.249 1.95 ( 3.40) 0.133
6 1.41 (3.80) 0.190 0.22 ( 0.36) ¡0.013
8 1.29 (3.50) 0.186 0.43 ( 0.67) ¡0.009
1973:1–1989:4 2 1.43 (6.37) 0.418
4 1.27 (7.04) 0.516 1.10 ( 3.16) 0.235
6 1.07 (5.99) 0.528 0.71 ( 2.30) 0.092
8 0.88 (6.50) 0.457 0.17 ( 0.54) ¡0.010
1973:1–1997:4 2 1.06 (5.36) 0.274
4 0.95 (5.40) 0.348 0.85 ( 3.03) 0.172
6 0.83 (4.98) 0.376 0.60 ( 2.39) 0.084
8 0.67 (4.94) 0.322 0.15 ( 0.60) ¡0.004
1985:1–1997:4 2 0.47 (1.82) 0.079
4 0.50 (1.66) 0.139 0.51 ( 2.53) 0.097
6 0.55 (1.77) 0.243 0.57 ( 2.57) 0.125
8 0.56 (1.94) 0.327 0.43 ( 1.40) 0.064
where y is quarterly real GDP and s is the spread. Values for k are 2, 4, 6, and
8. The regressions for marginal predictability are of the form
(400/2)ln(yt+k/yt+k¡2) = ®0 + ®1st + et (2)
and analyze whether the spread helps predict two-quarter output growth k
periods in the future.
The ﬁrst set of regression results are shown in Table 2. With the exception
of the 1985 to 1997 sample period, the spread is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
in predicting cumulative output growth up to two years into the future.3 In the
latter period it is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. One notices, however,
that the coefﬁcients on the spread vary over different sample periods as does
the informativeness of the spread as measured by the regression’s adjusted R2.
3 All standard errors have been adjusted using the methodology suggested in Newey and
West (1987). I also look at sample periods that conform to high and low inﬂation environments,
namely, 1955:1 to 1972:4, 1973:1 to 1983:4, and 1984:1 to 1997:4, without any signiﬁcant change
in the nature of the results.           
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For example, the spread is an exceptionally good predictor of output growth
over the 1973 to 1989 period.
The marginal predictive power of the spread is documented in the last two
columns of Table 2. Consistent with the results in Estrella and Hardouvelis
(1991) and Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), the spread generally has predic-
tive content for economic growth only up to six quarters. That is, it is helpful at
predicting two-quarter growth rates two quarters in the future and four quarters
in the future. The spread is not informative about two-quarter growth rates at
more distant horizons. Consequently, its ability to predict cumulative growth
two years into the future is solely due to its strong association with near-term
growth. As in the cumulative regressions, the ﬂavor of the results would not
be changed by using a spread that is composed of two-year or ﬁve-year long
bond rates.
Alternative Speciﬁcations
For several reasons, one might expect that the predictive content of the spread
could be improved by analyzing some alternative speciﬁcations. First, many
of the episodes in which the spread inverts are also associated with contrac-
tionary monetary policy. It may be that combining an increase in the funds
rate with a narrowing of the spread indicates tight monetary policy, and it
is only these episodes in which the spread has predictive content. Thus the
spread’s signal value could be enhanced by adding an interactive term that
incorporates tight monetary policy. Second, as mentioned, the spread contains
a term premium that may add noise to any signal that the spread provides about
the expected course of real interest rates. If this is so, then extreme values of
the spread may have more predictive content than the spread itself. Also, if
only large and unexpected changes in monetary policy signiﬁcantly affect real
economic activity, then it may be that only large movements in the spread are
associated with changes in economic growth. By decomposing the spread into
three components—unusually high values, normal values, and unusually low
values—and by testing to determine if these different ranges imply a differ-
ent relationship between the spread and economic growth, one could uncover
nonlinearities in this relationship.
Speciﬁcally, the regression used for analyzing the combined effect of a
monetary tightening and the spread is given by
(400/k)ln(yt+k/yt) = ®0 + ®1dtst + ®2st + et, (3)
where dt is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the funds rate
is raised by 50 basis points or more over the preceding two quarters.4 To
investigate the presence of nonlinearities, I run the following regression:
4 Using cutoffs of 75 basis points or 100 basis points produces similar results.             
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(400/k)ln(yt+k/yt) = ®0 + ®1hst + ®2mst + ®3lst + et, (4)
where hst takes on the value of the spread when the spread exceeds its average
value by more than 0.425 standard deviations and is zero elsewhere. Similarly,
the variable lst equals the spread when the spread is below its mean by more
than 0.425 standard deviations. Otherwise it takes on the value zero. The vari-
able mst equals the spread when each of the previous variables is zero and
is zero elsewhere. The value 0.425 is chosen so that each variable equals the
spread approximately one-third of the time. Also, the sum of the three variables
is the spread itself. By dividing the spread into high, low, and intermediate val-
ues, one can check if output growth is more responsive to extreme values of
the spread.
The results of these two investigations are depicted in Table 3. The sample
periods are representative of the general results. The top half of the table shows
that including tight monetary policy into the regressions does not signiﬁcantly
affect the forecasting ability of the spread. When the interactive term dtst is
entered by itself, the adjusted R2 is lower than in the comparable regressions
using the spread by itself. Also, when both variables are entered simultaneously,
only the spread retains its statistical signiﬁcance.
The bottom half of the table shows the results of the analysis regarding
nonlinearities. One can make a case for nonlinearity in the relationship between
future output growth and the spread. Output growth responds more strongly to
low values of the spread. This result may be due to the short, sharp nature of
recessions, which tend to be associated with inversions in the yield curve. Both
high values and intermediate values of the spread are signiﬁcant over the entire
sample, but high values are more likely to be signiﬁcant in each subsample. In-
deed, intermediate values do not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on output
growth over the periods 1973:4 to 1989:4 and 1985:1 to 1997:4. For the entire
sample period one can reject the equality of the coefﬁcients. Equality, however,
cannot be rejected over any of the subsamples.5 The case for nonlinearities is,
therefore, not overwhelming.
A Closer Look at the Information Content of the Term Structure
In this section I explore the additional information contained in the spread.
Previous works, for example, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Plosser and
Rouwenhurst (1994), and Estrella and Mishkin (1997), have investigated this
issue to some extent. Basically, these papers have simultaneously included
5 The relevant statistic for the test of equality among the coefﬁcients is distributed Chi-
squared with 2 degrees of freedom. The test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the
whole sample; the levels are 0.017 for k = 2 and 0.011 for k = 4. For the period 1955:1 to
1973:4, the signiﬁcance levels are 0.843 and 0.962. For the sample 1973:1 to 1989:4, they are
0.780 and 0.775. And for the sample 1985:1 to 1997:2, they are 0.117 and 0.690.             
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Sample Period k ® ®1 ® ®2 R2
1955:1–1971:4 2 1.04 (2.86) 0.069
2 0.50 (1.42) 0.81 (3.82) 0.143
4 0.66 (2.05) 0.043
4 0.09 (0.33) 0.85 (3.48) 0.178
1973:1–1989:4 2 1.46 (3.56) 0.208
2 0.38 (0.92) 1.27 (5.23) 0.417
4 1.14 (3.53) 0.205
4 0.13 (0.50) 1.20 (5.32) 0.503
Nonlinearities
Sample Period k ® ®1 ® ®2 ® ®3 R2
1955:1–1977:4 2 0.73 (3.41) 1.33 (2.56) 2.44 (3.64) 0.181
4 0.70 (2.97) 1.27 (2.75) 2.07 (3.69) 0.236
1955:1–1973:4 2 2.04 (3.34) 2.17 (3.35) 2.93 (2.14) 0.131
4 2.02 (4.73) 2.00 (3.93) 2.41 (1.81) 0.229
1973:1–1989:4 2 1.31 (4.82) 1.77 (1.44) 1.76 (2.21) 0.409
4 1.13 (4.00) 1.19 (1.47) 1.61 (3.12) 0.504
1985:1–1997:4 2 0.70 (2.00) 0.75 (1.20) 4.87 (1.99) 0.096
4 0.62 (1.56) 0.78 (1.02) 2.45 (0.97) 0.113
another leading indicator or an index of indicators, a contemporaneous short-
term interest rate or monetary aggregate, or the current growth rate of output.
None of them have added a number of lags of other economic variables as is
typically done in the VAR literature. Here I add two lags of output growth and
four lags of the short-term nominal interest rate and test if the spread retains any
signiﬁcant predictive ability. The tests are performed with respect to cumulative
output growth two and four quarters into the future. Thus a typical regression
is given by







cjrt¡j + dst + et,             
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Table 4 Additional Information in Spread
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Sample Period k §b §cd R2
1955:1 – 1971:4 2 0.20 (1.62) ¡0.29 (¡2.47) 0.48 ( 1.83) 0.23
4 0.05 (0.31) ¡0.30 (¡2.71) 0.32 ( 1.22) 0.31
1955:1 – 1973:4 2 0.15 (0.80) ¡0.29 (¡0.99) 1.71 ( 1.91) 0.18
4 0.24 (0.82) ¡0.34 (¡1.10) 1.74 ( 1.97) 0.27
1973:1 – 1997:4 2 0.25 (1.73) ¡0.11 (¡0.70) 0.60 ( 2.04) 0.27
4 0.05 (0.32) ¡0.14 (¡0.99) 0.22 ( 1.11) 0.28
1985:1 – 1997:4 2 0.33 (2.20) ¡0.50 (¡1.91) ¡0.28 (¡0.91) 0.17
4 0.13 (0.30) ¡0.48 (¡1.52) ¡0.07 (¡0.14) 0.14
where r is the interest rate on the three-month Treasury bill.6 The results of this
experiment are reported in Table 4. Over the entire sample period the spread
is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level when predicting growth six months ahead
but not statistically signiﬁcant when predicting growth four quarters ahead.
The spread is helpful in predicting two-quarter- and four-quarter-ahead growth
rates over the 1955:1 to 1973:4 period and in predicting six-month growth
over the 1973:1 to 1997:4 period. However, for this latter period the coefﬁcient
on the spread is insigniﬁcant when predicting four-quarter-ahead growth. This
outcome is somewhat surprising given the results in Tables 2 and 3. Consistent
with the results in Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996), the spread does not appear
to be statistically signiﬁcant over the most recent sample period of 1985:1 to
1997:4.
Hence, the results of this exercise indicate that the information content
of the spread is reduced once other variables such as past output growth and
past levels of short-term interest rates are taken into account. One must be
a little guarded about the last statement. Estrella and Mishkin (1997), among
others, stress that in-sample and out-of-sample predictive content are two very
different things. Their work indicates that although parsimonious speciﬁcations
may not perform as well in-sample, they often provide more accurate out-of-
sample forecasts. In the next section, therefore, I investigate the out-of-sample
predictive properties of the various models considered above.
6 A distributive lag of past spreads was statistically insigniﬁcant. Also, longer lag lengths
on past output growth were generally insigniﬁcant as well.      
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Table 5 Root Mean Squared Errors
Forecasts 1970:1 to 1997:4
Start Date 1955:1
Speciﬁcation RMSE DM RMSE DM
1970:1–1997:4 1985:1–1997:4
Equation 5
without the spread 2.171 1.802
Equation 5 2.170 2.274 2.17 (0.03)
Start Date Advances
Equation 5
without the spread 2.171 1.848
Equation 5 2.081 0.56 (0.58) 2.215 2.11 (0.04)
Equation 1 1.950 1.02 (0.31) 2.437 2.87 (0.00)
Equation 3 1.990 0.85 (0.40) 2.455 2.37 (0.02)
Equation 4 1.926 1.12 (0.26) 2.199 2.38 (0.02)
4. OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTS
I now look at the out-of-sample forecast accuracy of one-year-ahead output
growth for the variety of speciﬁcations considered in the previous section. The
forecasts and the actual data are presented in Figures 3 through 5, and the root
mean squared errors (RMSE) of the forecasts are given in Table 5. Forecasts are
made over the period 1970:1 to 1997:4. The comparative predictive accuracy
of the forecasts is analyzed using the methodology of Diebold and Mariano
(1995) on differences of the squared forecast errors. The value of their test
statistic and its signiﬁcance level is reported in the columns labeled DM. This
comparison is made for the entire forecasting period and for the more recent
period of 1985:1 to 1997:4.
In Figure 3, the start date for the regressions is kept ﬁxed, and the end date
is continually advanced. Hence, the forecast for output growth over the period
1969:1 to 1970:1 uses data available up to 1968:4. I ﬁrst examine forecast accu-
racy using the speciﬁcation in equation (5), with and without the spread. As one
sees from the two forecasts and the reported RMSE’s, adding the spread does
not signiﬁcantly improve the out-of-sample forecasts. The root mean squared
error declines almost imperceptibly from 2.171 to 2.170.
The in-sample regressions examined in the previous section, however, indi-
cate that the coefﬁcient on the spread varies over different sample periods. This
behavior implies that a better forecasting procedure might be to roll the starting
date of the regression forward as well to allow the estimated coefﬁcients to
change more rapidly. The results of this experiment are depicted in Figure
4. Here there is some improvement, with the RMSE declining from 2.171 to   
M. Dotsey: Interest Rate Term Spread 45





















2.081. The forecast including the spread does not overpredict the depth of the
1980 recession by quite as much as the speciﬁcation without the spread, and
it does not predict a sharp decline in output in 1985. The speciﬁcation with
the spread also indicates a slightly weaker economy in 1990 and 1991, but
neither speciﬁcation comes close to predicting a recession. On net, including
the spread produces only a small gain in forecasting accuracy, and this gain is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
Surprisingly, over the entire forecasting period, only the nonlinear speciﬁ-
cation produces better out-of-sample forecasts than the spread by itself, and the
improvement is minor (an RMSE of 1.926 as opposed to 1.950). Although the
spread by itself produces a 10 percent increase in forecasting accuracy, as com-
pared with a model that uses lagged values of output growth and lagged values
of short-term interest rates (see Figure 5a), this increase in forecasting accuracy
is statistically insigniﬁcant using the DM test statistic. Much of this gain is due
to the improved forecasts in the early 1980s. Including a dummy variable
that indicates tight monetary policy, as in equation (3), does not improve out-
of-sample forecasting performance. Consequently, even though a parsimonious           
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speciﬁcation that uses only the spread produces superior forecasts, the forecasts
are not statistically signiﬁcantly better.
Over the more recent sample period, the results are strikingly different.
Here the VAR model without the spread produces the most accurate forecasts,
and these forecasts are signiﬁcantly better.
5. PREDICTING RECESSIONS
In this section, I look at the ability of the spread to predict the onset of a reces-
sion using the probit model described in Estrella and Mishkin (1998). Based on
the preceding section, the analysis concentrates on out-of-sample predictions
but ﬁrst analyzes some in-sample predictions. The relative ability of the vari-
ous speciﬁcations given in equations (1), (3), (4), and (5) to accurately forecast
recessions is indicated by the pseudo R2.7 Its values are displayed in Table 6,
7 The pseudo R2 is given by 1 ¡ [log(Lu)/log(Lc)]¡(2/n)l o gLc, where Lu is the log of the
unconstrained likelihood function and Lc is the log of the maximum value of the likelihood
function under the constraint that all coefﬁcients except the constant term are zero.      
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as is the signiﬁcance of the various coefﬁcients in the probit regressions.8
As one sees from the table, the spread by itself predicts the in-sample
probability of a recession relatively well. Adding a term that incorporates tight
monetary policy does not help forecast recessions, nor does a speciﬁcation that
8 The signiﬁcance levels for individual coefﬁcients are corrected using the procedure in Es-
trella and Mishkin (1998). I wish to thank Arturo Estrella for sharing his code. The signiﬁcance
levels for joint tests of the coefﬁcients on the lags of GDP growth and the T-bill rate were
calculated using likelihood ratio tests that were not corrected for serial correlation.         
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Table 6 Signiﬁcance of Variables for Predicting Recessions
Using Probit Model
Speciﬁcation Variables Signiﬁcance Level Pseudo R2
1 spread 0.0000 0.277
2 spread 0.0004 0.281
d*spread 0.45
3 2 lags of GDP 0.85 0.171
4 lags of T-bill 0.0000
4 2 lags of GDP 0.126 0.317
4 lags of T-bill 0.604
spread 0.0000
allows for nonlinear effects of the spread (the latter experiment is not reported).
Adding the spread to a speciﬁcation that includes lagged values of GDP growth
and lagged values of the Treasury bill rate noticeably improves the in-sample
forecasts of a recession.
The out-of-sample forecasts for speciﬁcations 1, 3, and 4 are shown in
Figures 6a, 6b, and 6c. Only the pseudo R2 for the speciﬁcation using the
spread by itself is positive and equals 0.324. The reason the pseudo R2 is
negative for the latter two out-of-sample forecasts is that the measure imposes
a signiﬁcant penalty for predicting a high probability of recession, when in fact
no recession occurs. Also, the penalty is nonlinear, rising steeply for big forecast
errors. These errors are more frequent in the latter two speciﬁcations. In some
sense, though, the penalty is overly harsh because it is imposed equally whether
the prediction of a recession is off by one quarter or whether the prediction
occurs in the middle of an economic boom.
The three ﬁgures indicate that using the spread reduces the chance of
falsely predicting the onset of a recession. This feature is particularly evident
in comparing Figures 6b and 6c, where using the spread signiﬁcantly reduces
the probability of a recession during the mid-1980s. One also notices that while
prior to the recessions in the 1970s and 1980s the three speciﬁcations forecast
a high probability of recession, none of the speciﬁcations accurately signaled
the 1990–91 recession. This evidence is consistent with that reported in Dueker
(1997) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998).
As a ﬁnal check on the spread’s ability to forecast recessions, I compared its
performance with that of a naive forecasting model that predicts the economy
will be in its current state one quarter into the future. Even though the naive
forecast uses more current information, the forecasting ability of the spread is
noticeably better than the naive model. The DM statistic, which is based on    
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squared forecast errors, is 2.30, and the forecasts are, therefore, statistically
different at the 2 percent signiﬁcance level.
6. CONCLUSION
This article has investigated the forecasting properties of the yield spread
for economic activity. It mainly concludes that the spread contains useful    
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information—information not contained in past economic activity or past mon-
etary policy. Combined with the work of other authors, most notably Estrella
and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella and Mishkin (1997, 1998), and Plosser and
Rouwenhorst (1994), the article adds to the evidence that the spread has been
a useful leading indicator of economic activity. That conclusion must be tem-
pered, however, by the observation that over more recent periods the spread has
not been nearly as informative as it has been in the past. It is impossible to say
whether its reduced predictive content is a function of some permanent change
in the economy, or is only transitory, or is simply an outcome of examining a
small sample period characterized by relatively little output variability. Given
the spread’s long history as a useful forecasting tool and the simplicity of
its use, it will probably continue to receive signiﬁcant attention in both the
ﬁnancial press and academic research.
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